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A Principled Approach to Valuing Career Goodwill
As Distributable Community Property
Brian K. Matise

I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has evolved from an industrial society to a post-industrial
informational society in a period ofjust over twenty years.' This social and economic
transformation has caused legal scholars to rethink traditional conceptions of work2,property3,
and capital.' With the possible exception of land, tangible property often has fleeting value in this
new economic regime. Rapid technological change makes equipment and machinery obsolete.
International saturation advertising, made possible by instantaneous global communication,
reduces the value of hedonic investments. Low-cost foreign production has reduced the value of
mineral resources and raw materials.

r'

Wealth has taken on a new meaning in today's volatile economy. Joan Williams has
pointed out that today even relatively wealthy individuals accumulate few net assets compared to

I See. e.g., Marshall Leaffer, Protecting Authors' Rights in a Digital Age, 27 U. Tol. L. Rev. 1,2
(1996); Gary Minda, Antitrust at Centurv's End, 48 S.M.U. L. Rev. 1749, 1750 n.4, 1771
(1995); John B. Oakley, The Future Relationship of California's State and Federal Courts: An
Essav on Jurisdictional Reform, the Transformation of Propertv, and the New Age of
Information, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2233,2241-42 (1993).

'See Thomas Earl Geu & Martha S. Davis, Work: A Legal Analvsis in the Context of the
Chaneinp.Transnational Political Economy, 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1679, 1698-99 (1995).

S e e Oakley,

note 1, at 2242-43 (arguing that "soft property," such as software and other
intellectual property, is increasingly valuable as a means for making productive use of "hard
property").

"See Joan C. Williams, Married Women and Property, 1Va. J. Soc. Pol'y
-/'

& L., 392-93 (1994)

(investment in skills is the major form of capital in the twentieth century); Randolph Stuart
Sergent, Building Re~utationalCapital: The Right of Attribution under Section 43 of the Lanham
Act, 19 Co1um.-VLA J. L. & Arts 45 (1995).

their annual i n c ~ m eWealth
.~
in today's society is based on the ability to generate future i n ~ o m e . ~ Q
This new wealth has taken two primary forms: financial assets (stocks, bonds, savings accounts
and similar investments) and human capital.' Human capital is an investment in skills and
knowledge that generates income-earning capacity.' Human capital may take the form of higher
education, professional licenses, specialized skills, or even sales contacts.
The evolution of human capital as a primary source of wealth in the United States has
created difficulties for family law courts attempting to distribute property at divorce or
~eparation.~
Feminist writers have noted that gender roles necessarily lead to inequities in human
capital because women typically disinvest in their careers to raise children or to promote a
husband's career opportunity, while men continue to enhance their careers.I0
This essay presents the thesis that the enhanced earnings capacity of a career (human
capital) that results from the investment of community labor and community funds during a

'See Williams,

note 4, at 393.

a

Robert C. Ellickson, Pro~ertvin Land, 102 Yale L. J. 1315,1353 & n.181 (1992), cited by
Williams, id.at 393 n.62, (arguing that in the United States human capital makes up more than
75% of wealth because compensation of employees and income of sole proprietors amount to
more than that fraction of national income).

'See John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Centurv Revolution in Familv Wealth Transmission, 86
Mich. L. Rev. 722,723 (1988).

See id.; Williams,

note 4, at 393 (quoting Allen M. Parkman, No-Fault Divorce: What
Went Wrong? 130 (1992): "Human capital exists when individuals have an income-earning
capacity.")

'See Parkman,

note 8, at 114-15. Parkman notes that no-fault divorce and the trend
toward an equal distribution of property result in inequities when human capital is not considered
to be property. See id.at 129-30.
Williams, m a note 4, at 394; Joyce Davis, Enhanced Earnine Ca~acitvIHumanCa~ital:
The Reluctance to Call it Prover&, 17 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 109, 111 & n.21 (1996).
'O

'3

'-'/

marriage.is an intangible asset, career goodwill," that can be valued in the same manner as other
forms of goodwill. Other commentators, most notably Allen Parkman, have proposed valuing
human capital in a similar manner." Courts have been inconsistent in their recognition of this
goodwill because of conceptual diff~cultiesin understanding thenature of goodwill and because
courts fail to understand how to value this goodwill. The essay presents a principled approach to
valuing this goodwill consistently, regardless of the type of career or form of business enterprise.
11. The Problem Presented: A Search for a Principled Treatment of Goodwill

Entrepreneurs have recognized goodwill as a property right for over 400 years.13 Today,
goodwill constitutes the bulk of the value of the largest American companies.'Yet, despite its
II

P

This paper will refer to the capitalized value of the enhanced earnings potential of a career as
''career goodwill" independent of the form that the asset holds. Other authors have used slightly
different terms to refer to career goodwill. See Lenore J. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution
121-24 (1985) (using the term career assets); Davis, m note 10, at 109 n. 1 (defining human
capital); Diane Green Smith, Note, 'Ti1 Success Do Us Part: How Illinois Promotes Ineauities in
Provertv Distribution Pursuant to Divorce bv Excludinp Professional Goodwill, 26 J. Marshall
L. Rev. 148 (1992) (using the term professional goodwill). Career goodwill is broader than
human capital because it encompasses intangible assets that can be transferred, such as customer
lists, contracts, and goodwill in professional corporations. Enhanced career earnings capacity
may result from many different events or career attributes. For example, earnings capacity of a
career may be enhanced by the attainment of a degree or a professional license, by obtaining an
extensive clientele or developing an extensive network of contacts, by developing celebrity
status, or even by obtaining a promotion to a new level of responsibilities. All of these events
enhance the earnings capacity of a career in a more or less permanent way and therefore
contribute to career goodwill.
Parkman, m note 8, at 130-32. Parkman proposes to value human capital by reducing
the increase in the stream of expected future earnings during the marriage to present value by
applying a discount factor.
id. at 132. Parkman also proposes compensating the spouse who
"disinvests" in a career in order to support the other spouse. See id.at 132-34. This article
modifies Parkman's valuation approach by considering what portion of future enhanced earnings
potential should be capitalized and what factors should enter into the capitalization formula to
answer certain concerns of courts, particularly with respect to transferability of the career
goodwill.
It&

l3

n

See George R Catlett & Norman 0. Olson, Accounting for Goodwill 8 (1968) (citing P.D.

Leake, Goodwill: Its Nature and How to Value It, The Accountant, January 17, 1914 at 81).
Leake mentions a 1571 AD conveyance of all the interest and goodwill in a quany in England.
See id.
--

ubiquitous nature, the proper treatment of goodwill in divorce or separation proceedings
continues to be a source of debate and disagreement between scholars. Nearly a quarter century
ago, Dr. Lenore Weitzman began the scholarly debate over whether professional licenses,
degrees, and other career assets should be treated as property capable of division upon divorce or
separation.'' The problem cited by Dr. Weitzman and by other scholars is that the investment by
married couples in the future earnings capability of one of the spouses is often the most valuable
investment made during any marriage. If a marriage ends in divorce or separation, the spouse
whose career has been enhanced leaves the marriage with a significant economic advantage over
the other spouse. The economic advantage is even more pronounced if the marriage ends before
the spouses have had the opportunity to acquire substantial tangible property or otherwise benefit
from the career investment.
Despite the extensive scholarly debate, the problem appears as intractable as ever.I6

Courts are becoming increasingly polarized on this issue. New York and New Jersey courts
recognize not only professional degrees and licenses" but also celebrity careers" as marital

l4

See discussion infra Part IV & notes 38-39.

l5 Jana B. Singer credited Weitzman's article, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and
Change, 62 Cal. L. Rev. 1169 (1974), with coining the term "career assets" and beginning this
debate. See Jana B. Singer, Husbands. Wives and Human Cauital: Why the Shoe Won't Fit, 31
Fam. L. Q. 119,119 (1997). See also Lenore J. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution ch. 5
(1985). Weitzman's treatise included pensions, professional education and-licensesto practice a
profession or trade, fringe benefits of employment, and the goodwill of a business in her
definition of career assets. See id.at 110. In chapter 5 of her treatise, Weitzman analyzed
goodwill value of a business as a separate career asset from professional education and licenses
rather than the same asset - goodwill. See id.at 121-24. I suggest that the failure of Weitzman
and other commentators to treat career goodwill in a unified manner may contribute to the
inconsistent treatment of these assets by the courts.
16*
Joyce Davis, Enhanced Earnine Cauacitv/Human Cauital: The Reluctance to Call it
Pro~ertv,17 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 109,110 (1996).

" See O'Brien

1983).

v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1985); Dugan v. Dugan, 457 A.2d 1 (N.J.

n

property capable of distribution. On the other extreme, Texas and Louisiana courts refuse to
recognize all professional goodwill, including goodwill in professional corporations.19 Some
commentators have called for such drastic measures as requiring equal post-divorce sharing of
income for a number of years or a limited fault-based defense.lo Other commentators despair that
judicial application of no-fault divorce laws sabotages the policy of equal division of community
property by not considering certain assets in distributable community property.

These

commentators suggest that prospective spouses can protect themselves only through antenuptial
agreements.=
This essay presents the thesis that courts in most jurisdictions have dealt with this
problem inconsistently because of a conceptual difficulty in understanding the nature of goodwill
and how to value it. Spouses who practice their chosen careers through partnerships, closely
held corporations, or some types of sole proprietorships, usually find the courts treating their
enhanced earnings capacity as goodwill of the business enterprise and holding that it is a
divisible asset. On the other hand, courts rarely find a divisible asset where a spouse practices a
career as an employee or as a professional sole proprietor. There does not appear to be any
principled reason why the form of the business enterprise (corporation versus sole proprietorship,

See Golub v. Golub, 527 N.Y.S.2d 946,950 (Sup. Ct. 1988); Piscopo v. Piscopo, 557 A.2d
1040 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989); Elkus v. Elkus, 572 N.Y.S.2d 901 (App. Div. 1991).

l8

l9

See Preis v. Preis, 649 So. 2d 593 (La. Ct. App.

1994); Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761, 764

(Tex. 1972).

See Jana B. Singer, Husbands. Wives and Human Capital: Whv the Shoe Won't Fit, 31 Fam.
L. Q. 119, 130 (1997); Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. Rev.

20

1103, 1117 (1989).
See Nora J. Lauerman, A Stev Toward Enhancing Eaualitv. Choice and O ~ ~ o r t u n ito
tv
D ~ T I O Din Marriage and at Divorce, 56 U. Cin. L. Rev. 493,5 11 (1987).

" -See id. at 518-19.

for example) or the nature of the career (professional manager versus attorney) should affect
whether a court recognizes a property right in the enhanced earning potential.=
Several equitable distribution states2' and three community property statesz5provide a
spouse who invests in the career of the other spouse an equitable right to reimbursement for some
of the investment. This approach, when used by community property states, presents several
analytical problems. First, why should it matter that the non-career spouse earned the funds used
to support the career of the other spouse? For community property states, it is irrelevant which
spouse works to earn the community assets. Second and most importantly, there is no reason for
equitable reimbursement if the career investment is not property. A right to equitable
reimbursement exists, in the context of community property, when community property is used
to improve the separate property of one of the spouses. Therefore, the equitable reimbursement
right is inherently contradictory. On the one hand, it arises because the career is held not to be
community property. On the other hand, it is premised on the perception that the spouse
possessing the career leaves the marriage unjustly enriched by an investment of community labor

,?

and funds in a separate asset.
Numerous courts and commentators have raised this issue. See, e.&, Mitchell v. Mitchell, 732
P.2d 208,211 (Ariz. 1987) (recognizing that "[ilt would be inequitable to hold that the form of
the business enterprise can defeat the community's interest in the professional goodwill.")
23

24

Equitable distribution states, for the purposes of this essay, are those states which do not treat
property acquired during the marriage through the labors of the spouses as community property
but instead provide for an equitable division of marital property upon divorce. Forty-one states
and the District of Columbia are included in this category. See, e.G, Diane Green Smith, Note,
'Ti1 Success Do Us Part: How Illinois Promotes Ineauities in Pro~ertvDistribution Pursuant to
Divorce bv Excluding Professional Goodwill, 26 J. Marshall L. Rev. 147, 157 (1992).
Community property states treat all property acquired during the marriage through the labors
of the spouses as community property by default, with an equal distribution of community
property the rule upon termination of the community by divorce or separation. Nine states
(Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Washington and
Wisconsin) are community property states.
Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review
of the Year in Familv Law: A Search for Definitions and Policy, 31 Fam. L. Q. 613,654 table 5
(1 998).
25

'7
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111. Three Hypothetical Cases as a Tool for Analysis

Consider three hypothetical professionals. Able, a medical doctor, establishes a
professional corporation with another doctor. The professional corporation is organized under
the New Mexico Professional Corporation Act, which prohibits non-physicians &om owning
shares in the corporation. Over a period of ten years, the corporation's income has increased
dramatically due to the fine reputation of the physicians. In a divorce or separation proceeding,
Dr. Able's spouse presents expert testimony that the corporation's fair market value is twice the
value of the tangible assets based on its ability to generate above-average earnings.
The second professional, Brenda, is a veterinarian who developed a private practice. Her
practice, a sole proprietorship, thrived over ten years, similar to Dr. Able's practice. However,
she grew tired of the management and accounting headaches. A company that manages
veterinary practices presented the following proposal to her. The company would pay her for the
fair market value of the tangible assets of the practice, but would not pay for any goodwill. She
r\

would continue to work for the company as an employee, performing the exact same duties as
before. She would receive as a salary an amount of money roughly equivalent to what she had
earned as profits in the previous year with appropriate adjustment for the value of fringe benefits,
and she would receive an annual bonus if the practice's revenues increased in the future. Dr.
Brenda immediately accepted the offer. A few months later, she divorces her spouse of 20 years.
Her spouse presents expert testimony that she can expect to earn substantially more in income
over the next 15 years because of her well-established practice.
The third professional, Chuck, is a corporate sales executive without a degree. A major
corporation hires Chuck because of the sales contacts that he developed over the past ten years.
He earns approximately the same annual income as the other professionals listed above. Chuck
was married during the ten years that he developed those sales contacts. His spouse supported
the family both financially and emotionally in the "lean" years while Chuck was on the road.
Chuck files for divorce. His spouse presents expert testimony that Chuck can expect future

/-'

income considerably greater than other sales executives because of the sales contacts that he
developed during his years of marriage.
All three individuals listed above possess high earnings potential as they leave their
marriage based on skills, reputation, education, and other qualities that they obtained during
marriage. All three possess a career asset that is analogous to goodwill in the economic sense an expectation of a stream of future earnings resulting from intangible factors. This paper will
label thiscareer asset "career goodwill." Yet, there are some differences between the
individuals. Dr. Able practices medicine in a professional corporation with another doctor. Dr.
Brenda practices alone - initially, she practiced in a sole proprietorship, but at the time of divorce
she was an employee. Chuck has always been an employee. Dr. Able and Dr. Brenda have
professional licenses and degrees, but Chuck does not.
These three hypothetical examples illustrate the unprincipled nature of some of the
distinctions used by courts to support recognition of career goodwill in some cases but not in
others. For example, Dr. Able practices medicine through a professional corporation while Dr.
Brenda was a sole proprietor before selling the assets of her company. Why should the form of
organization of the business enterprise (professional corporation versus sole proprietorship)
affect the judicial decision to recognize goodwill?z6 Dr. Able practices with another professional
while Dr. Brenda is the sole professional. Yet, both business enterprises possess goodwill based
on an established clientele. Is that customer loyalty personal goodwill to the sole proprietor (and
therefore not community property) but business goodwill (and therefore community property) if
the proprietor associates with another professional or hires an employee?'
Dr. Brenda's sale of her practice's tangible assets, but not the practice's goodwill,
illustrates the need to treat employees and sole proprietors consistently. After the sale of the
practice's tangible assets, Dr. Brenda retains the rights to the stream of excess income that results

26

See Mitchell v. Mitchell, 732 P.2d 208 (Ariz. 1987).

27

See Finch v. Finch, 825 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. App. 1992).
8

,?

F'

from her practice's accrued goodwill. She is now an employee rather than a sole proprietor. If
goodwill were recognized as community property before the transaction, why should goodwill no
longer be recognized after the transaction?
Lastly, the comparison between Dr. Brenda and Chuck illustrates the conceptual
difficulties that result when a court states that it is the professional degree or license that is the
"property." Chuck does not have a professional degree or license. He is an employee, just as Dr.
Brenda is. He has career goodwill (customer lists, sales contacts, etc.) that a business would
regard as intangible property rights constituting goodwill. Does a court refuse to recognize
goodwill because Chuck does not have a degree or license that it can point to as the "community
property" subject to division?
These examples illustrate the need to treat career goodwill consistently and to develop a
valuation methodology that accounts for career goodwill in all three cases. The similarities in the
nature of the career goodwill between these three cases outweighs any differences based on
artificial distinctions such as the form of ownership of a professional practice, the presence of a
professional degree or license, or the transferability of the practice.

IV. The Problematic Treatment of Career Goodwill by Courts in Community Property
States
Courts have had difficulty defining goodwill?8 Courts define goodwill as "the favor

28

See Catlett & Olson,
note 13, at 9. Courts are not alone in their difficulty, as Catlett and
Olson note that the concept of goodwill is among the most difficult in accounting. &id. One
reason why courts have had difficulty defining "goodwill" may have to do with the connotations
of benevolence or kind feelings implicit in the term. See Webster's 3d Int'l Dictionary (1981)
(providing one definition of "goodwill" as "kindly feeling: well-wishing, benevolence,
friendliness"). In an economic sense, "goodwill" has little to do with benevolence or kind
feelings, as Catlett and Olson note that the nature of goodwill has evolved over the years to
,--- include a much broader range of intangible assets. See Catlett & Olson,
note 13, at 9-12.

F'
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See Catlett & Olson,
note 13, at 9. Courts are not alone in their difficulty, as Catlett and
Olson note that the concept of goodwill is among the most difficult in accounting. &id. One
reason why courts have had difficulty defining "goodwill" may have to do with the connotations
of benevolence or kind feelings implicit in the term. See Webster's 3d Int'l Dictionary (1981)
(providing one definition of "goodwill" as "kindly feeling: well-wishing, benevolence,
friendliness"). In an economic sense, "goodwill" has little to do with benevolence or kind
feelings, as Catlett and Olson note that the nature of goodwill has evolved over the years to
,--- include a much broader range of intangible assets. See Catlett & Olson,
note 13, at 9-12.

which the management of a business wins from the public,"29 "the expectation of continued
public patronage,")' "the sum of all favorable attributes contributing to the earning power of a
bu~iness,"~'"advantages business has over competitors as a result of its name, location, and
owner's reputation,'"' and "any privilege that gives reasonable expectancy of preference in the

race of ~ompetition."~'In fact, none of these definitions is broad enough when goodwill is used
in the economic sense because goodwill is actually the value of earning power."
Goodwill in an economic or accounting context is the excess of a business' fair market
value over its tangible asset value?' Why would the market value a business in excess of its
tangible asset value? The answer can be found in almost any investment publication: earnings
p0tential.3~One of the principal indicators of a stock's value is the price to earnings multiple.)'

Holbrook v. Holbrook, 309 N.W.2d 343,345 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 625 (5th ed.
1979)).

29

'O

In re Marriage of Fleege, 588 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Wash. 1979).

3'

LeBlanc v. LeBlanc, 694 So. 2d 1172,1173 (La. App. 1997).

32

Marathon Petroleum Co. v. Chronister Oil Co., 687 F. Supp. 437,440 (C.D. Ill.).

Stefanski v. Gonnella, 446 N.E.2d 734,737 (Mass. App. 1983) (quoting InBrown, 150 N.E.
581 (N.Y. 1926)).

33

"See Catlett & Olson,
35

note 13, at 11-12.

See Black's
-

Law Dictionary (stating that "[iln the purchase of a business, goodwill generally
is the difference between the purchase price and the value of the assets acquired.") See also
Lanny M. Solomon et a]., Accounting Principles 388 (3d ed. 1990) (stating that goodwill is the
difference between current value of assets and purchase price of a business).
Solomon et al.,
note 35, at 388 (stating that a purchaser of a business "[iln all
likelihood" paid more than a business' net asset value because of anticipations that the
company's earnings record would continue).

16&52

n

The fact that the price to earnings multiple is the most widely recognized benchmark for
/-'

determining a stock's value provides compelling evidence that the right to share in future
expected earnings is a recognized property interest.
Corporate goodwill - i.e., the right to share in the earnings potential of corporations - is,
as an aggregate, the single most valuable asset in America today?' The financial markets value
the goodwill in the largest American corporations at over $3 trilli~n.'~
All community property states recognize the intangible goodwill of a business
corporation that was acquired during a marriage to be capable of division as community
property. The most obvious example is the goodwill component of publicly traded corporate
stock. Certainly no court would countenance the argument that the portion of the value of

,r

"See George Lasry, Valuing Common Stock: The Power of Prudence 120 (1979). The price
to earnings multiple is also known as price-earnings ratio or P/E ratio. The price to earnings
multiple is most meaningful when it is expressed as the ratio of the stock's price to the expected
earnings per share for the next 12 months. The P E ratio is positively correlated to a stock's
expected earnings growth and inversely correlated to the interest rate that investors could receive
for debt investments of similar risk. See id.at 121. The P/E ratio is calculated for most listed
stocks in the daily stock tables published in most major newspapers. See. e.&, Wall St. J., April
28, 1998, at C-3.

The five hundred large publicly traded corporations that make up the Standard and Poors 500
Stock index currently trade at market prices about 5 times their "book value," or the value of
their tangible assets. See Tom Walker, Atlanta J. & Const., April 11, 1998 at HI. This implies
that the market values these companies as worth 5 to 6 times the value of their tangible assets implying that goodwill makes up 80% or more of the value of the companies. Even assuming
that the "book value" of the tangible assets understates their actual value by a factor of two, the
S&P 500 price to actual tangible asset value would be 2.5 to 3, which implies that goodwill
makes up over 60% of the market value of these companies.
38

Bruce Burton, 144 Chicago Dailv Law Bull. April 20, 1998 at 6 (stating that at the end of
1995, the combined S&P 500 companies' market value exceeded the value of their fixed assets
by $3.4 trillion). Based on a price to book ratio of 5 and an S&P 500 market value of $6 trillion,
which would accurately reflect the increased market value of U.S. stocks from 1995 through
April 1998, goodwill is presently approximately $4.8 trillion.
39

,n

publicly traded common stock attributable to goodwill should not be included in community
property because it represents an intangible asset.
Two community property states draw the line between recognizing goodwill as
community property and treating it as personal to the career spouse based on whether the
goodwill is attached to a business enterprise distinct from the spouse's personal reputation. For
example, Louisiana courts refuse to recognize any goodwill in professional corporations as
community property because the goodwill, in their view, is merely the reflection of the
professional's reputation. Texas, similarly, refuses to recognize any goodwill in professional
practices, even if the practice has a developed clientele and the practice may be transferred to
another professional upon the retirement of the owner. The other seven community property
states allow goodwill in professional corporations to be divided as community property.
No community property states recognize the goodwill inherent in a professional license or
a degree to be a community property interest capable of division at divorce or separation?'
While the courts in these states agree that goodwill in a license or a degree is not a property
interest capable of division, they do so for numerous different reasons. Texas, for example,
rejects professional goodwill in all forms, holding that it is not a vested property right?' In
yJ&lNail",the court refused to recognize the goodwill of the husband's medical practice as

community property subject to division in a divorce proceeding. The court held that the accrued

" See, m,Joyce Davis, Enhanced Earning Cavacitv/Human Cavital: The Reluctance to Call it
Proverty, 17 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 109,l l l (1996); Linda Louise Blackwelder Pall, Treatment
of Education Earned During the Marriage at Divorce: An Eauitable Alternative for Idaho, 26
Idaho L. Rev. 499,502-03 (1989).
"

See Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761,764 (Tex. 1972).

-

n

goodwill in the practice:
did not possess value or constitute an asset separate and apart from his person, or from his
individual ability to practice his profession. . . . The good will of the husband's medical
practice here . . . may not be characterized as an earned or vested right or one which fixes
any benefit in any sum at any future time. That it would have value in the future is no
more than an expectancy wholly dependent upon the continuation of existing
cir~umstances.~~
Several Texas appellate courts have interpreted Nail to permit goodwill to be recognized where
there is evidence of business goodwill apart from the personal reputation of the professional
~pouse.'~A number of courts in community property states and equitable distribution states have
attempted to ameliorate the harsh effects45of their failure to recognize professional goodwill as
property available for distribution at divorce or separation. For example, the state of Washington
provides a right of equitable reimbursement to a spouse who provided financial support for the

A

professional spouse to earn a license or degree, but who did not benefit substantially from the
fruits of the license or degree.= In Washburn, Washington's Supreme Court decided two
companion cases, both involving spouses who supported their husbands through veterinary

"See Guman v. Guzman, 827 S.W.2d 445,447 (Tex. App. 1992) (citing Hirsch v. Hirsch, 770
~ K 2 924,927
d
(Tex. App. 1989); Keith v. Keith, 763 S.W.2d 950,952 (Tex. App. 1989); Finn
v. Finn,658 S.W.2d 735,740-41 (Tex. App. 1983); Geesbreght v. Geesbreght, 570 S.W.2d 427,
435-36 (Tex. App. 1978)).
The reader may question whether failure to reimburse a spouse for contributions to the
education and training of the other spouse should be viewed as a harsh result if the degree or
license that results from that training is not a property right but is a mere expectancy. The fact
that courts view this result as harsh provides further support that career goodwill in any form is a
property right that should be valued and included in the property distribution equation at divorce
and separation.
r'
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See In re Marriage of Washburn, 677 P.2d 152,158 (Wash. 1984).

school?' Both marriages ended in divorce; the Washburn marriage ended soon after the husband

n.

began his veterinary practice, while the Gillene parties separated just before Mr. Gillene obtained
his degree?"e

court refused to find a property interest in a professional degree, stating that it

was not "inclined to address at this time the somewhat metaphysical question of whether a
professional degree is 'pr~perty.""~Nonetheless, the Washburn court recognized an equitable
right of the spouse to compensation for the contribution towards the cost of an education."
California provides a similar right of reimbursement by statute." Section 2641 of the
California Family Code provides that the community is entitled to reimbursement for
contributions to the education or training of a spouse upon divorce or legal separation unless
"[tlhe community has substantially benefited from the education, training, or loan incurred for
the education or training of the party."52The same statute also provides that the right of
reimbursement "is the exclusive remedy of the community or a party" for the education or
training, thereby foreclosing the possibility of judicial recognition of an educational degree as

community pr~perty.'~

"

-See id. at 153-55.

' 5-e e id. at 154-55.

See id.at 161. The Washburn court provided the trial court with broad discretion to determine
the form of the compensation, stating that a lump-sum property distribution, periodic
maintenance award, or installment payments of a lump-sum maintenance award would be proper.
See id. at 158, 160.
-"

See Cal. Fam. Code 3 2641 (West 1994).

53&

id. 5 2641(d).

,-'.

There are several difficulties with the "equitable reimbursement" approach when applied

r\

in the context of community property. First, the equitable reimbursement approach was grafted
onto community property law from the equitable distribution jurisdictions without any discussion
of its basis in community property law. Washington's supreme court in Washbum borrowed
heavily from decisions of courts in equitable distribution states to fashion its solution.s4 In fact,
the Washbum court quotes the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Mahonev v. MahoneJS
to justify the need for reimbursement:
Where a partner to marriage takes the benefit of his spouse's support in obtaining a
professional degree or license with the understanding that future benefits will accrue and
inure to both of them, and the marriage is then terminated without the supported spouse
giving anything in retum, an unfairness has occurred that calls for a remedy.s6
California's statutory solution of imposing an equitable right of reimbursement appears to have
been more of a compromise than a principled resolution of the issue because California's
A

community property law requires community property to be divided equally at divorce." The
equitable distribution approach is not based on the general rule in community property states that
presumes community property is to be equally divided upon dissolution of marriage or legal
~eparation.'~
Equitable distribution states do not require an equal distribution of marital property
Washbum discussed reimbursement approaches used in Kentucky, Oklahoma, Minnesota, New
Jersey, Michigan,
- - Nebraska, Ohio, Colorado and Wisconsin (prior to Wisconsin's adovtion of the
uniform Marital Property Act in 1986), among others.
washbum at 155-56.
"

'6

Washbum, 677 P.2d at 160 (quoting Mahonev, 453 A.2d at 527).

"See Cal. Fam. Code 3 2550 (West 1994).
See William A. Reppy & Cynthia A. Samuelson, Community Property in the United
States 18-4 (1997). Reppy & Sarnuelson state that New Mexico, California, and Louisiana
require an equal division of community property, while Idaho and ~ e v a d require
a
an equal
division absent "compelling reasons." Arizona authorizes an equitable division of community
property, but the equitable division must be substantially equal. See id.at 18-4 n. 1. Texas,
Washington and Wisconsin permit equitable distribution of community property.
id.at 18-4.
"

f-'

upon divorce or separation, or even impose a rebuttable presumption that the marital property

-.

should be equally divided.19Grafting equitable reimbursement requirements that are not based on
the presumption of equal distribution of community property therefore violates a community
property policy.
A second, and perhaps more important, difficulty with the equitable reimbursement
approach is its requirement that in order for the community to be reimbursed, the spouse whose
career has not been advanced must have contributed to the development of the other spouse's
career.@ This requirement flies in the face of the community property policy that all income
earned by the labors of the spouses during the marriage is community regardless of which spouse
earned the income. For example, if the professional spouse paid for his or her education during
the marriage by working at a night shift job while the other spouse watched television all day, the
equitable reimbursement approach would deny reimbursement to the TV-addicted spouse.
Proper application of community property law would rehse to make a distinction -the
,?

professional spouse's night shift earnings that were used to pay for the education are community
funds for which the community is entitled to reimbursement.
Consider one final hypothetical example that illuminates the problem further. Assume
Wanda works at a salaried job as a western wear designer during a marriage to Horacio, while
Horacio works at a hamburger business. The hamburger business is community property. The
business never makes money and, in fact, periodic infusions of community funds are required to

"See. e.G, Jeffrey L Rehmeyer 111, Comment, Guide to Valuing Professional Partnershiv

Interests for Pumoses of Eauitable Distribution of Marital Assets Pursuant to Pennsylvania Law:
Intemretine and Avvlvine Partnership Agreements, 101 Dick. L. Rev. 489,490-91 (1997)
(stating that under equitable distribution principles as applied in Pennsylvania, "[a] court must
not presume a fifty-fifty division when distributing marital property, because equitable
distribution need not be equal, only equitable.")
The California statute, Cal. Fam. Code 5 2641 (West 1994), does not follow this approach, but
provides that if community funds are used to promote a spouse's career, the spouse must
reimburse the community. See id.
@

-,

/-'

keep the business afloat. The business has no goodwill because it has no prospects of generating
future income.6' When Wanda and Horacio decide to divorce, the couple has only the tangible
property in the business and a sum of cash equal to the fair market value of the business' tangible
assets. Horacio wishes to continue to run the business. He takes the business in the property
distribution and Wanda takes an amount of cash equal to the value of the business' tangible
assets. Should Wanda be entitled to an equitable reimbursement for the community funds that
were sunk into the community business to keep it afloat during the marriage? Certainly not Wanda has received half of the value of the tangible property and there is no remaining goodwill
value.
This last example illustrates the fallacy of the equitable reimbursement approach in the
community property context. The reason why courts in many jurisdictions require equitable
reimbursement for use of community funds that enhance a spouse's career is because the career
goodwill does have present value - it is, in fact, community property. Two questions remain to

P

be answered - whether there are any valid policy reasons against recognizing this career
goodwill and how to value that goodwill.

V.

Policy Reasons Offered for Failing to Recognize Career Goodwill as Distributable
Community Property
A number of courts have refused to recognize career goodwill based on the reasoning that

it is a mere expectancy of future post-separation earnings." The future earnings would be the
separate property of the spouse earning them if received after divorce or separation. The Nail
court appears to be concerned with the possible injustice that might result from prematurely
The business may even have "negative goodwill." See Shannon P. Pratt et al., Valuing a
Business: The Analysis and Appraisal of Closely Held Companies 295 (3d ed. 1996). This
phenomenon results when the tangible assets of a business are put to an economically inefficient
use that results in less income produced than the assets would produce in the average business.
P
,

"&Nail

v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761,764 (Tex. 1972).

capitalizing and distributing a future stream of earnings that never actually re~ults.6~
This justification for refusing to recognize career goodwill has been criticized as being
out of step with current economic reality. Investors determine the present value of future
earnings every day when corporate stocks are pur~hased.~
Courts in all states recognize pension
benefits as distributable marital or community property even though the benefits cannot be
realized until some time in the future, cannot be calculated until retirement, and may even
depend in part or whole on the employed spouse's post-separation earnings." Some courts have
attempted to distinguish pension plans from career goodwill because pension plans may be more
easily v a l ~ e d I. ~suggest that this is merely a conceptual difficulty - career goodwill can be
valued, as the Part VI of this essay illustrates.
Several courts have opined that career goodwill should not be treated as community
property because the goodwill is not transferable." Goodwill may not be transferable for several
63

See id.(stating that the goodwill of a husband's medical practice "would be extinguished in

event of his death, or retirement, or disablement. as well as in event of the sale of his practice or
the loss of his patients, whatever the cause.")

,?

"&George Lasry, Valuing Common Stock: The Power of Prudence 113-14 (1979). See
Luigi Guatri, The Valuation of Firms 70-72 (1994). Guatri states that firms are valued
not on their tangible assets but on the stream of earnings they are expected to produce. Guatri
analogizes the present value of a firm using the stream of earnings method to a perpetual annuity
or an annuity for a period of years depending on the period the earnings are expected to be
realizable. See id.

An example is an unvested defined benefit pension plan that may be based on the employee's
highest earning years of employment.
65

66SeeNail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761, 764 (Tex. 1972). Nail attempted to distinguish pension
benefits, which it classified as a vested property right subject to divestment, with goodwill value
of a medical practice, which it characterized as a mere expectancy, on the grounds that the
goodwill does not "fix[] any benefit in any sum at any future time. That it would have value in
the future is no more than an expectancy wholly dependent upon the continuation of existing
circumstances." Id.

6'See Hertz v. Hertz, 657 P.2d 1169,1174 (N.M. 1983) (goodwill value of a law firm limited to
$1 for division of community property at divorce because shareholder agreement provided that
the only way to transfer goodwill was to sell it to other shareholder for $1); Holbrook v.

T
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reasons. Career goodwill in the form of a professional license cannot be transferred or otherwise
jointly owned.68Ethical or legal restrictions on the transfer of a law practice or a professional
corporation's stock may also prevent the goodwill from being transferred.@Louisiana courts
reject distribution of professional goodwill on the policy grounds that it is personal to the holder
In &&,the Louisiana Court of
and cannot be separated from an individual's reputati~n.~
Appeal refused to find the goodwill of a multi-attorney law corporation to be community
property because the goodwill "cannot be separately sold or pledged by the individual owners. . .

. Clients of a law firm choose that firm based on its members and qualifications. Without its
attorneys, a law firm has no separate goodwill.'"'
Marketability or transferability of goodwill is a proper concern in valuing the goodwilln,
but it should not be a concern in determining the existence of the asset or its treatment as
community property." Lack of transferability should not affect the recognition of the goodwill

-

as an asset because it does have substantial value -to the practicing spouse."
Holbrook, 309 N.W.2d 343 (Wis. App. 1981) (law practice goodwill is not divisible community
property because it is not transferable)

"&Muckleroy v. Muckleroy, 498 P.2d 1357 (N.M. 1972) (medical license).
69

See Holbrook v. Holbrook, 309 N.W.2d 343 (Wis. App. 1981).

'O

See Preis v. Preis, 649 So. 2d 593,596 (La. App. 1994).
See id.
--

&g Pratt et al., =
a
note 61, ch. 15. Pratt points out that marketability affects the value of
an asset and lists several techniques for factoring marketability into the value equation. & id.at
332-34,363.

See In re Marriage of Luckey, 868 P.2d 189, 193 (Wash. App. 1994) (stating that "[allthough
professional goodwill may not be readily marketable, the ixhportant consideration is not whether
it can be sold to another party, but whether it has value to the professional.")

-.

See Reppy & Samuelson,

note 58, at 13-7 to -8 and cases cited therein. Reppy and
Samuelson note that Arizona, California and Washington courts do not reject goodwill as
community property based on transferability. See id.

74

Rejecting career goodwill as community property because it is personal to the individual

A

possessing it presents policy issues that are more difficult to answer. Community property states
treat post-divorce income as the separate property of the spouse earning the income. If the career
goodwill represents the entire future earnings stream of one of the spouses, the other spouse will
receive a double recovery by collecting the present value of the future income stream that should
be, at least in part, separate property.75The solution to this problem is to value only a portion of
the future earnings stream as community property goodwill. Again, the problem is one of
valuation, not classification of the asset. The excess earnings method, which is a common
business valuation technique discussed infra part VI, properly accounts for only the future
earnings stream attributable to community investment in the career."
States such as Louisiana that refuse to value personal or reputational goodwill attempt to
distinguish between goodwill that attaches to the person and goodwill that attaches to the
business." In

m,for example, the goodwill of a multi-lawyer professional law corporation was

excluded from distribution because the law firm had no "separate" goodwill apart from the
reputation of the attorneys." I propose that the distinction made in && is based on a mistaken

See Robin P. Rosen, Note, A Critical Analysis of Celebritv Careers as Pro~ertvuDon
~ z l u t i o of
n Marriage, 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 522,554-55 (1993). Rosen argues that
"P]ecause celebrity careers have no economic value aside from their future earnings capacity,
they should not be considered a separate asset for distribution upon divorce." See id.at 555. I
agree with Rosen to the extent that the entire future earnings stream should not be considered in
the calculation of career goodwill. However, I propose that a well-defined enhancement to the
future earnings stream that resulted from education, training, professional licensing, or acquiring
a clientele can be valued separately from the entire future earnings stream. See infra part VI.
7s

Cf. Pratt et al.,

note 61, at 291 (discussing the need to subtract from the income stream
of the business all income not properly attributable to the goodwill being valued when using the
excess earnings method to capitalize earnings.)
76

See Preis v. Preis, 649 So. 2d 593, 596 (La. App. 1994).
78

-See id.

?

,
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notion of what goodwill actually represents. The

court used goodwill interchangeably with

rep~tation.'~
Other courts have made the same error.rn Goodwill value is based on premium
earnings of an enterprise, and is much broader than reputation alone.81Certainly, a multi-lawyer
corporation has economic efficiencies that generate premium income, including an established
clientele, efficient office operations from sharing staff and caseloads, and professional synergies.
Attempting to distinguish between these types of goodwill results in three unprincipled
distinctions: 1) distinctions based on the form of the business enterprise, 2) distinctions between
professional versus non-professional corporations, and 3) distinctions between service and
product enterprises. Courts have distinguished goodwill based on the form of business
enterprises2or whether the business enterprise had employee^.^' One reason for this distinction is
that sole proprietorship goodwill is more personal because it can be extinguished at death or
retirement." A majority of recent court decisions have criticized a distinction based on the form

,-.

See id.(refusing to recognize professional goodwill because "the reputation of a law firm is
valuable to its individual owners to the extent it insures continued earnings in the future. . . .
Clients of a law firm choose that firm based on its members and qualifications.")

Holbrook, 309 N.W.2d 343,350 (Wis. App. 1981) ("a professional business's
good reputation . .. is essentially what its goodwill consists of'). See also Nail v. Nail, 486
S.W.2d 761,763 (Tex. 1972) (goodwill of a professional is "a result of confidence in his or her
skill and abi1ity");Guzman v. Guman, 827 S.W.2d 445,447 (Tex. App. 1992) (defining
professional goodwill "as that which: attaches to the person as a result of the clients' confidence
in professional skill or ability.")
rn See Holbrook v.

See George D. McCarthy & Robert E. Healy, Valuing a Company 121 (1971); Catlett &
Olson,anote 13, at 11. See also discussion aPart IV.

"

"See Mitchell v. Mitchell, 732 P.2d 208,211 (Ariz. 1987).

"See Finch v. Finch, 825 S.W.2d 218,224-25 (Tex. App. 1992).

" Comuare Finch, 825 S.W.2d at 224-25 (recognizing goodwill as divisible community property

/-'

because the goodwill would not be extinguished completely upon death of the proprietor
"because persons other than the appellant performed some of the work at the shop and fostered
the good will toward the customers.") with Guzman v. Guzman, 827 S.W.2d 445,447 (finding
no goodwill in a solo CPA practice that existed independently of the professional's skills).

of the business enterprise because the community contribution to the success of the business is

-,

the same regardless of the form of ownership." If goodwill is viewed in a broader context than
merely reputation, the death or retirement of the professional may not extinguish all goodwill.
For example, the location, customer base, and operating efficiencies of a professional practice
may contribute to earnings potential and may be transferable to a new professional. The possible
death of a professional and the value of the corporate form are relevant to the valuation of the
goodwill, as will be discussed infra Part VI, but are not relevant to the classification of goodwill
as divisible community property.

ProfessionaVnonprofessionaland product/service distinctions are also illusory when
goodwill is viewed in its broader context as earnings capacity. Consider a sole proprietorship
bakery without employees other than the owner. The bakery delivers a product rather than a
service. The quality of the product, the development of the customer base, and the timely
delivery of goods all depend on the efforts of the baker. The goodwill value of the bakery
depends on its ability to produce income, and that income-producing capacity depends on the
entrepreneurial skills of the baker. Why should a sole proprietorship bakery be held to have
goodwill apart from the personal qualities of the baker, yet a professional practice's earnings
capacity is held to be too personal? The answer is that there is no principled distinction if
goodwill is recognized to be enhanced earnings capacity.

VI.

Developing a Valuation Methodology
Courts have used a number of methods to value goodwill.86Several of the methods used

by courts to value goodwill are not suitable for valuing career goodwill. For example, the market

"See Mitchell, 732 P.2d at 21 1.
See In re Marriage of Crosetto, 918 P.2d 954,958 (Wash. App. 1996) (straight capitalization of
earnings, capitalization of excess earnings, IRS valuation of capitalized excess earnings, market
value, and buylsell agreement make up a non-exclusive list of methods for valuing goodwill).

,-,,
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"See Mitchell, 732 P.2d at 21 1.
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earnings, capitalization of excess earnings, IRS valuation of capitalized excess earnings, market
value, and buylsell agreement make up a non-exclusive list of methods for valuing goodwill).
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value method is not suitable for valuing goodwill in professional practices that cannot be
tran~ferred.~~
Relying on buy/sell agreements to set the value of goodwill can produce
inequitable results when such agreements are intended to provide a method for a partner or
shareholder to withdraw from the business rather than to establish a value for the g0odwill.8~
Therefore, a valuation method with general applicability should be based on one of the income
approaches.
The preceding parts of this essay demonstrate that the value of career goodwill in
whatever form - a professional corporation, sole proprietorship, advanced degree, professional
license, regular sales contacts, or superior skills from specialized training - must be based on
future earnings capacity. Similarly, this essay seeks to value career goodwill as a
property interest capable of distribution at time of divorce or separation." The starting point for
valuation, therefore, is to capitalize the stream of future income. Capitalization is simply the
process of converting an amount of income received over some period of time to its present

,--

value.g0The capitalized value of a stream of income is the value that an investor in the
The main factors
marketplace would be willing to pay for the right to receive that in~ome.~'
affecting that market value include the amount of income anticipated, the duration of income
flow, whether the income is anticipated to increase or decrease with time, and the risk premium
that an investor demands." Each of these factors must be analyzed separately in the context of

"See Mitchell v. Mitchell, 719 P.2d 432,437 (N.M. App. 1986) (holding that "[elven though
goodwill may not be a salable asset, it can have value and should not be ignored.")
Mitchell v. Mitchell, 732 P.2d 208,212 (Ariz. 1987).
This is consistent with the "clean break" doctrine and the policy reasons for avoiding continued
dependency of a wife on alimony.
Davis, anote 10, at 144-45 and discussion infra Part
VII.
89

"See Pratt et a].,
9'

fl.

-See id. at 152.

note 61, at 159.

See also Lasry,

" See ex., Guatri, m

a note 64, ch. 4.

note 37, at 113-14.

career goodwill to be distributed as community property at divorce or separation to obtain a
meaningful value.
1. Earninns that Should Be Included in the Ca~italizationFormula

When valuing the goodwill of a business by capitalizing earnings, only the excess
earnings attributable to the intangible goodwill should be included in the capitalization f ~ r m u l a . ~
The term "excess" refers to the premium earnings capacity above what the business' tangible
assets would yield, and above what the proprietor of the business would earn as an employee
performing the same work but without owning the business. This makes sense in a market
valuation analysis - goodwill represents the excess value that an investor would pay to own the
business above the tangible asset value.%Those tangible assets have income generating potential
-at the least, they can be liquidated and the proceeds invested in financial assets. Similarly, if
the proprietor could earn a wage equivalent to the expected profits of the business, the proprietor
could do better investing the purchase price in other financial assets and working as an
employee."

.?

This definition of "excess" earnings needs to be modified to be relevant to the problem of
valuing the increased career goodwill that results from a community investment in human
capital. Whereas the goodwill of the business capitalized the earnings in excess of the tangible
assets' earnings capacity and proprietor's salary, the community career goodwill should reflect
capitalization of the excess earnings that resulted from the investment in human capital during
the marriage. Therefore, the future earnings capacity of the career spouse should be compared
before and after the human capital investment. The difference in future earnings capacity should

"&Pratt

et al., -note

61, at 287,291.

"See GAAP Guide 5 3.03 (1997).

" Of course, this analysis is overly simplistic because it neglects other non-economic benefits of
business ownership such as control over the business, job satisfaction, and employment security.

n,

P

be the measure of the excess earnings to be capitalized.

2. Appropriate Duration of the Expected Income to be Capitalized
Courts that have recognized career goodwill as community property have been sensitive
to the fact that career goodwill may have a finite life span." Capitalization of earnings formulas
that are used to value the goodwill of small closely-held companies take into account the
possibility that the duration of income may be linked to the life span of one or more p e ~ s o n s . ~
Of course, the life span of goodwill may approach perpetuity for some types of career goodwill.
One example might be an interest in a professional corporation or partnership that is a wellestablished practice. Despite the reasoning of the Preis court98that the goodwill of a well
established multi-attorney fm is based on the reputation of the attorneys in the firm, many wellestablished professional practices do survive their founders, and the entitlement to work for such
a firm provides enhanced eamings to the partners or shareholders.
The duration of the career goodwill can often be determined from the form of ownership
P

or the form of the career goodwill. For example, career goodwill based on advanced degrees,
professional licenses, and employment entitlements is limited to the career life span of the
individual. Transferable goodwill in professional practices may have a much longer duration.
Goodwill of sole proprietorships, customer lists, marketing contacts or celebrity status pose more
difficult problems because even though the death or retirement of the owner may affect the
goodwill value, some of the goodwill may s ~ r v i v e ? ~
The discussion above illustrates some of the conhsion that courts have experienced in
See In re Marriage of Luckey, 868 P.2d 189,194 (Wash. App. 1994) (holding that goodwill of
practice was properly set to zero because of the age, health and declining eaming power of the
practitioner).
%

"See Guatri,

note 64, at 71-72.

98Preisv. Preis, 649 So. 2d 593,596 (La. App. 1994).

,o %See
-Guatri,

note 64, at 72.

deciding not to recognize goodwill by holding that it is personal to the individual rather than
associated with a business concern. Whether goodwill is personal to the holder is a factor to
consider in valuing the goodwill by determining the duration of the income stream to be
capitalized. As Guatri points out, uncertainties over whether the goodwill is tied to the career of
one or more individuals is simply a risk associated with human capital that should be taken into
account by the capitalization formula, and it is routinely taken into account by economists
valuing businesse~.'~~

3. Antici~atedIncreases or Decreases in Income
The income from a professional career can increase over time due to many factors,
including the general inflation level, productivity increases, supply and demand imbalances for
certain types of skills, and routine improvements in worker skill levels due to experience on the
job. Income may also decrease, particularly as a professional approaches retirement and seeks
?
I

greater leisure time. Goodwill capitalization formulas routinely include similar increases or
decreases in income when valuing business goodwill.""
Career goodwill calculations must also take into account the anticipated growth (or
decline) in future earnings. The difficulty is to determine what portion of the growth in earnings
is a reflection of the present value of the investment in human capital as opposed to inflation or
some other factor not representing a true property interest. Similarly, if part of the increase in
future earnings results from greater experience or future continuing professional education, then
the earnings may not reflect present human capital investments but future investments.
This paper suggests that future increases or decreases in total career earnings should be
projected based on present career skills, with adjustments made for economically defensible
forecasts of future earnings growth for the career. Even though inflation is included in this

"'See Lasry,m a note 37, at 114 (stating that the present value of stock is concerned with the
future earnings trend of the company); Guatri,

note 64, at 83.
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figure, inflation also enters into the risk-adjusted discount rate discussed in the next section.
Thus, inflation is both included in the capitalization and then discounted when the capitalized
earnings are reduced to present value.
The earnings of the individual before the investment of human capital must also be
adjusted for anticipated increases or decreases. The approach used in this paper is to determine
the present income potential of the individual with the skills and training available before the
community investment. This pre-marriage career potential is then adjusted for future trends
before it is subtracted from the anticipated income of the individual after the community
investment in human capital.
It is possible that a spouse investing in human capital may enter a career with greater
potential growth or lesser potential growth than the career for which he or she was qualified
before marriage. In this case, it is appropriate to consider differences in future earning potential
because these differences correctly represent a wise (or poor) investment in human capital which is exactly what goodwill is meant to represent, i.e., premium earnings from efficient use of
capital.

4. Discount Factor to Reflect Risk Premium
The discount factor that is used to reduce the future stream of income to present value is
probably the most important factor in this calculation because it affects the final valuation more
than any other factor and it is subject to wide variation. The process of discounting "is the very
~~
the proper discount rate requires estimating the risk-free
heart of v a l ~ a t i o n . " 'Determining
interest rate that an investor would demand for capital (including estimates of future inflation and
a rental value for the use of the capital)'", a risk premium that takes into account the uncertainty
that the investor may not receive the expected income stream,lWand a premium for lack of
ImPrattet at.,
'03&

id. at 162.

P:

I M B i d . a t163.

note 61, at 151.

marketability (for example, if the career goodwill could not be sold because it was a degree or

9

license)'05.
A discussion of all of the factors that enter into the discount rate is beyond the scope of

this paper. In an actual valuation, an expert economist's opinion would probably be required.'"
However, it is important to note that the discount factor takes into account many of the
objections raised in Part V of this paper. The discount factor mitigates the harshness of lack of
transferability of the career goodwill because the value of the future stream of income is reduced
to account for the risk that the stream of income may not be realized. The discount factor takes
into account the risk that an individual or small proprietor may die or retire prematurely.
The discount factor generally ranges from 15% to as much as 50% depending on the form
of the goodwill. IRS Revenue Ruling 68-6091Msuggested a 15 to 20% capitalization rate on
excess earnings.108However, the use of a 1968 capitalization rate is probably invalid today
because inflation, interest rates, and market volatility has increased. Pratt suggests capitalization
rates of 20 to 25% for small business valuation.109Parkman suggests a value as high as 50%
might be appropriate for certain forms of human capital where continued earnings prospects are
uncertain."O

IM&
Theodore P. Orenstein & Gary N. Skoloff, When a Professional Divorces: Strategies
for Valuing Practices, Licenses and Degrees, 112 (1994).

' T e v . Rul. 68-609, 1968-2 C.B.327.
10'Thecapitalization rate is equal to the discount rate if the excess earnings are assumed to remain
constant with time. If the earnings are expected to increase over time, then the capitalization rate
is equal to the discount rate minus the expected annual rate of growth of the excess income. See
Pratt et al.,
note 61, at 159.

Parkman,

note 8, at 130-32.

-?

F'

After appropriate estimates are obtained for all of the factors listed above, the career
goodwill may be valued. The procedure is as follows:

1) For each year for which the career goodwill is expected to generate future income,
estimate the amount of future income from the career, adjusting for anticipated increases or
decreases in earnings.

2) Subtract the anticipated future income that the spouse would have earned based on the
skills and career potential before the community investment in human capital. Also, subtract the
income generating potential of any tangible assets used in the business. This yields excess
earnings.

3) Reduce the excess income for each year to net present value by dividing it by a factor
that takes into account the discount rate and the number of years before the income will be
generated.

4) Compute the sum of the net present value of each year's earnings over the duration of
P

the career goodwill. For degrees, licenses, and other goodwill personal to the individual, this
should be the expected remaining career life span. For transferable assets, an estimate is required
for the number of years that the goodwill is expected to continue generating excess income.
These four steps are summarized mathematically by the following formula:
Present Value = C Ei / (I +k)'

In the above equation, the summation operator, C, indicates that earnings in a given year i
(represented Ei) must be divided by a discount factor, (l+k)', summed over the number of years
of the useful life of the goodwill. The discount factor merely represents the compound rate of
interest that would have to be paid to attract the investor, with k being a risk-adjusted interest
rate."'
The reader unfamiliar with the mathematical procedure of reducing income to present value
should not be intimidated by this equation. Most computer spreadsheet programs perform this
calculation automatically once the user supplies the excess income over a period of years, the
'I1
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It should be noted that the career goodwill valuation approach discussed in this part

?

should not eliminate the burden of proof on the spouse seeking a division of career goodwill to
prove that there has been an identifiable enhancement of human capital or other forms of career
goodwill. The career goodwill valuation approach should only be used after the non-career
spouse has satisfied the burden of proof on the threshold question of whether there has been an
investment of community resources that enhanced the career goodwill of the other spouse. The
spouse should be required to point to the specific manner by which the career goodwill has been
enhanced. Acquiring a professional license or advanced degree, establishing a business, entering
into a long-term employment contract, gaining celebrity status, developing established repeat
clients that routinely generate sales commissions, or completing an internship are all possible
ways to satisfy this burden.'12 A step increase in pay or normal career progression due to
longevity would not qualify as an increase in career goodwill in most circumstances. Such salary
increases reflect factors independent of a human capital investment - such as the normal "draw
T

down" of human capital that occurs as an individual approaches the end of employable life,
increased productivity gains, or favorable collective bargaining results by a union.
A second problem may arise when an individual changes career during marriage. For
example, assume that Bertha has a B.S. degree in physics and marries while employed as an
entry-level physicist. Several years later, while still manied, she enters law school. A week after
graduating, Bertha is divorced. Is Bertha's spouse entitled to a division of career goodwill
because she acquired a law degree? The answer to this question depends on whether her human
discount factor, and the duration of the excess income.
Routine improvements in skills should not be included for two reasons, one pragmatic and the
other theoretical. Routine improvements in skills from longevity on the job may be too difficult
to value because higher salaries awarded workers may serve multiple purposes, such as reflecting
less need of the employer to supervise and train these employees or greater job stability. From a
theoretical view, routine on-the-job training may be viewed as an incidental benefit of the
employment that was already included in the human capital of the career spouse and would be
realized without any further community investment.
'I2
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capital has been enhanced by the law degree. Here, the spouse claiming a share of the career
goodwill must prove that Bertha's future income as

a lawyer

as a physicist with a law

degree is greater than it would have been as a physicist without the law degree."'
In the p r e d i g hypothetical, the spouse seeking a division of career goodwill had the
option of two methods to prove enhanced earnings, depending on the most economically efficient
use of the career resource (i.e., employment as a lawyer or employment as a physicist with an
advanced degree). The career spouse, similarly, should have the option of pro-rating a partially
earned but incomplete form of career goodwill, such as a nearly completed professional degree,
at the time of marriage. Because the asset, career goodwill, was partially earned with separate
funds and partially earned with community funds, pro-rata apportionment of the career goodwill
is appropriate."' However, if the spouse entering the marriage with the partially completed
degree could show employment at a salary exceeding that calculated from the pro-rata share of
the degree, that spouse should elect to use the higher of the two figures for calculating initial
C

career goodwill.115
VII.

Policy Implications of Valuing Human Capital as Career Goodwill

Valuing human capital as career goodwill overcomes two problems of the present
community property system. First, this approach overcomes the economic problem of
externalities - wise economic decisions made by the marital partners if the community remains
' I 3 A related problem cited by Reppy & Samuelson,
note 58, at 13-9, involves multiple
marriages
of
celebrities
where
separate
labor
and
community
labor from one or more of the
marriages contribute to the human capital. The approach suggested in this Part requires each
spouse seeking a distribution of career goodwill to show that the community investment in
human capital produced an increase in value over the value at the beginning of the marriage.

This is consistent with the pro-rata apportionment of community and separate ownership
interests in an asset used by states such as California. See Marriage of Moore, 618 P.2d 208
(1980).
'I4
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"'See example and discussion infra Part VIII for an illustration of this approach.
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"'See example and discussion infra Part VIII for an illustration of this approach.

intact may be thwarted by a decision of one of the partners acting in his or her own interest to the

,
,

detriment of the other partner. Pollution problems provide the classic illustration of externalities.
Consider two nations, Industrica and Naturis, that share a common border. Industrica has
polluting industrial plant on the border. The social and economic costs of pollution from the
plant is $300,000, while the cost of equipping the plant with pollution control equipment is
$200,000. The pollution control equipment would completely eliminate the social cost.
Installing the equipment would be a wise economic decision. But if half the pollution is blown
across the border so that Naturis bears half the burden of the pollution, then it would not be a
wise economic decision for Industrica to mandate the equipment because Industrica would
receive only $150,000 in benefits for the $200,000 in costs. The solution is to internalize the
externality by requiring Industrica to bear the cost of the pollution that blows across the border to
Naturis.

-

In the case of family law, the externality that needs to be internalized is the ability of a
spouse to leave the marriage with a disproportionate share of human capital paid for by the
community investment. The decision of one of the spouses to "disinvest" in his or her human
capital to promote the net human capital of the community might be a wise economic and social
decision if the community is assumed to remain intact.'I6 However, if one of the spouses is

=

Parkman,
note 8, at 132. Parkman suggests that the reduction in human capital of
the spouse who "disinvests" (usually the wife) should be compensated by the other spouse as if
the decrease in human capital were a community debt to the separate estate. See id.at 133. I do
not adopt this approach in my analysis because it is inconsistent with community property
notions that the fruits of labor during marriage are community property. Human capital
depreciates with time if not replenished (analogous to amortization of goodwill) due to decreased
earning lifetime and obsolescence of skills. Therefore, the reduction in human capital is not
really analogous to a community debt or a withdrawal of separate human capital but a failure to
make additional human capital investments. Community property principles can be reconciled
'I6
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permitted to leave the marriage with separate human capital acquired through community labor
and investment, several problems may arise. The system may unwittingly encourage divorce in
marginal cases because the career spouse may make the economic decision (unwise to the
interests of the community, but wise to the interests of the career spouse) to divorce and take as
separate property his or her career g~odwill."~
Alternatively, the spouses may choose to invest
their labor during marriage as "separate labor" in their own human capital.Il8This phenomenon
of separate labor thwarts the policy goal of the community property system that all labor during
the maniage should be for the benefit of the c~mmunity."~
Valuing human capital as career goodwill allows it to be divided at divorce or separation.
This offers the possibility of eliminating the problem of dependency resulting from continued
payments of alimony.'" Refusing to recognize human capital as property has forced several

with the notion of human capital only if the separate human capital that existed before marriage
is impliedly transmuted over time into community labor by the spouse continuing the
community. The disinvesting spouse essentially has transmuted separate human capital into
community labor during the marriage, which can then be traced to an investment in community
human capital. The community human capital investment can be valued as career goodwill at
time of divorce or separation, fully compensating the disinvesting spouse.
I"

See Ann Laquer Estin, Love and Oblieation: Familv Law and the Romance of Economics, 36

Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 989, 1057 & 11.288 (1995). Estin cites a number of law and economics
scholars who support the proposition that failure to consider human capital as property results in
"distorting incentives" encouraging economically inefficient divorce.
id.

See Reppy & Samuelson, =a

note 58, at 11-28 (pointing out the anomalous possibility of
"separate labor" in community property states).
See Michael J. Vaughn, The Policv of Communitv Prouertv and Inter-S~ousalTransactions,
19 Baylor L. Rev. 20,26 (1967) (citing Richard Ballinger,
- A Treatise on the Property
- - Rights
of ~ " ; b a n d and Wife, under the community o r Ganancial System, 5 4 (1895)).

p

I" See Parkman,
note 8, at 136-37 (arguing that human capital eliminates the need for
alimony in many instances).

courts to deal with imbalances in human capital through alimony."' But, as Joyce Davis
forcefully states, "[h]uman capital is property and property is power."'22 Dependence on alimony
can exact a severe toll, by economically and psychologically, on the spouse without the career
investment, most often the wife:
Requiring the husband to pay alimony to the wife does not contemplate parties in equal
relationship to each other: one is dependent, subservient, one independent, more
powerful.

Refusing to recognize that the husband's human capital is marital property ties the wife to
him in a way that maintains their unequal relationship. It keeps her dependent on him
and allows him to exert power over her. It also impacts adversely on her view of herself
and the world's view of her. It denies her personhood, her autonomy, and her free
agency. Whether intended or not, one of the results of the courts' failure to call human
capital property is to do exactly what George Gilder has suggested: keep women
economically dependent on men.'"
Treating human capital as a

property interest, career goodwill, rather than a mere

expectancy, prevents the psychology of dependence cited by Davis. It also eliminates the need
for continuing jurisdiction of courts over the divorce (such as the concurring opinion in O'Brien
v. O'Brien foresawnu)or the need for cumbersome pooling arrangements proposed by other

'" &g Nora J. Lauerman, A Step Toward Enhancing Eauality, Choice and Ovwrtunitv to
Develo~in Maniaae and at Divorce, 56 U. Cin. L. Rev. 493,498-99,5 10-11 (1987) (pointing
out that the refusal of courts to include career assets as distributable property, and their
increasing reliance on rehabilitative alimony, has left many women at a severe economic
disadvantage at divorce).
In

Davis,

In

Id.at 144-45 (footnote omitted) (citing George Gilder, Sexual Suicide (1973)).

note 10, at 109.

'"See 498 N.Y.Supp. 2d 743,751-52 (Meyer, J, concurring).

' \
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authors.lZ5Although some may criticize the harshness of assigning a present value to a career
asset that may not be realized,Ia6our legal system routinely takes this approach through the single
judgment rule in tort lawlZ7and the civil procedure doctrine of mergerLz8.The approach presented
in this paper mitigates the harshness somewhat by including a discount factor that should account
for the probability that the career goodwill will not be realized.'29

Application of the Valuation Methodology

VIII.

This section will illustrate how the career goodwill valuation methodology is applied by
considering the hypothetical examples presented in Part 111. The hypothetical examples were
designed to test the career goodwill valuation approach on several levels: 1) whether career
goodwill could be valued independent of the form of business organization; 2)whether changing
the form of the goodwill from proprietary goodwill to employee goodwill made a difference; and
lp'

3) whether the approach produced consistent results for career goodwill of professionals and
nonprofessionals.
In the first example, Dr. Able is a professional who owns career goodwill in several
forms. He possesses an advanced medical degree, a license to practice medicine, and a

Singer,anote 15, at 131 (proposing "income sharing rules that would require
divorcing parents to continue to pool their joint incomes for a significant time period after
divorce.").
lZ5

'%See
-O'Brien, 498 N.Y. Supp. 2d at 751 (Meyer, J., concurring) (posing the hypothetical
unfairness of awarding a portion of the career goodwill in a medical degree to a spouse should
the "general surgery trainee accidentally lose the use of his hand.").
Iz7&

,p

Restatement (Second) of Torts $ 912 cmt. e, $ 913A (1979).

Iz8

& Restatement (Second) of Judgments $ 18 (1982).

I"

See
-

Part VI.

reputation in the community as a fine physician. All of these attributes contribute to income

'?

earning capacity. He also shares in the goodwill of the professional corporation. This latter form
of goodwill results from many factors, including the reputation of the medical clinic, the
established lists of clients who will likely return due to inertia, the location of the clinic, possible
synergies between the professionals, and possible management efficiencies. The goodwill of Dr.
Able's practice has limited transferability because Able's interest may be sold to another
physician, subject to contractual restrictions or restrictions placed in any applicable Professional
Corporation Act. If a market value can be established for the professional corporation's goodwill
based on the price that a newly licensed physician would be willing to pay, that goodwill should
be valued separately from the goodwill that is personal to Dr. Able.
If a market value cannot be established for the clinic, the professional corporation's
excess earnings can be computed by subtracting the average wagesI3"of an employed physician
in the area from Able's share of the profit^'^'. Assume, for example, that Dr. Able's share of the
profits is $300,000per year, while the wages and benefits that a physician with Dr. Able's
training would earn as an employee is $150,000. This equates to $150,000 of excess earnings
per year. Next, assume that Dr. Able's share of the net tangible assets of the corporation
lJO "Wages" here includes total employee remuneration, including standard fringe benefits in the
profession. Whether or not taxes are subtracted from the wages should depend on the policies of
the jukisdiction. Some jurisdictions do not adjust for taxes because they & too speculative,
especially when the profits of a corporation may be reinvested tax-free for an extended period of
time. See Grossnickle v. Grossnickle, 935 S.W.2d 830,847(Tex. App. 1996). Where taxes that
will actually be paid at the professional's tax rate can be estimated reasonably, they should be
'106,at 112.
subtracted from income. See Orenstein & Skoloff, -note

Orenstein and Skoloff point out that these statistics are available from the United States
Department of Labor, American Bar Association, American Medical Association, and similar
groups. See id.
13'
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amounts to $500,000 and 10% return is considered fair for tangible assets. The tangible assets
would generate another $50,000 in income per year that must be subtracted from the excess
income to yield a net annual excess income of $100,000.
Once annual excess income is computed, the duration of the excess income must be
projected. If the clinic's ownership can be transferred to another physician without appreciable
loss of goodwill, the stream of income may extend indefinitely beyond Dr. Able's employable
life span.'32 If the clinic's goodwill is so dependent on Dr. Able remaining with the clinic, then
the duration of the excess earnings should be limited to Dr. Able's employable life span.
The final step in computing the corporation's goodwill is to reduce it to present value by
including a discount rate. An appropriate discount rate should reflect the limited transferability
of Dr. Able's interest (resulting in a lower discount rate than if the goodwill could not be

/--

transferred but a higher discount rate than freely transferable goodwill), the stability of the excess
income (more stable and predictable excess income flows implying lower discount rates) and the
dependence of the excess income on the continued services of the key personnel (small clinics
more dependent on key employees should be awarded higher discount rates). Let us assume for
this example that a 25% discount rate is appropriate. The goodwill is then capitalized using the
formula in Part VI, m.Proper application of the math yields a value of $357,050 for a 10year flow of $100,000 per year in excess income. If the excess income flow is assumed to be
perpetual because Dr. Able's interest can be transferred and survives his career life span, then its

/-'

For practical purposes, at discount rates of 25%, income more than 10 years in the future may
be ignored because the difference between the net present value of a 10 year income flow and a
perpetual income flow is only about 10%. For example, the net present value of a perpetual flow
of income at $10,000 per year is $40,000 at a 25% discount rate, while the net present value of a
10-year income flow is $35,705. See spreadsheet calculations on file with author.

present value increases to $400,000.
The goodwill of the clinic is only the first part of the calculation. Next, the career
goodwill value of Dr. Able's personal capital that accrued during the marriage must be
determined. Assume that Dr. Able was a third-year medical student one year away fiom
completing his degree at the time of marriage. A third-year medical student who does not
complete a degree may be employed in several capacities at above-average income. Assume that

Dr. Able could earn $30,000 without attending medical school at all, $50,000 a year without
completing his degree, $80,000 upon completing his degree but not completing his residency or
obtaining his license, and $150,000as an employed physician. Dr. Able's career goodwill before
the community investment in his education and training would be based on the greater of

$50,000per year potential annual income employed as a non-physician with three years of
medical school training or $30,000(earnings before medical school) plus three-fourths of the
value of the medical degree ($50,000per year increase in earnings). The latter value totals

$67,500. Therefore, Dr. Able's earnings capacity has been increased by $82,500 per year due to
the community investment in his human capital.

Dr. Able's career goodwill value is calculated by estimating his employable life span,
estimating a discount factor, and reducing the excess income to present value. Let us assume a
10-year employable life span for Dr. Able. A relatively high annual discount factor should be
used - perhaps 25% to 50%

- for this type of career goodwill because its value cannot be realized

through a sale or other transfer.IJJUsing a 30% discount rate, the net present value of the $82,500

Parkman suggests a 50%
discount rate might be appropriate for professional goodwill
that is "uncertain and unmarketable." See Parkman,
note 8,at 132.This value appears
high because it implies an investment in a professional career has an expected payback period of
13'
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annual excess earnings flow is $255,052."'
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The total value of Dr. Able's career goodwill is the sum of the professional practice's
goodwill and the personal goodwill inherent in his medical degree, license, and specialized
training. In this example, the goodwill should be separated because the practice goodwill may be
transferable, giving it a greater life span than Dr. Able's career. The transferability also affects
the discount rate to be applied - transferability reduces risk (and therefore the discount rate)
because there is a greater likelihood that the professional will realize its value.
The second hypothetical example presented in Part 111 illustrates the effect of a change in
the nature of the goodwill on its valuation. Dr. Brenda's practice goodwill would be calculated
in the same manner as Dr. Able's practice goodwill before the sale of the practice's assets. After
the sale of the veterinary practice, Dr. Brenda retains the practice's goodwill through her
I
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employment contract. Dr. Brenda's employment contract provides her with excess earnings
above what the usual practitioner would realize. In this example, Dr. Brenda's career goodwill
from the entitlement of employment at premium earnings can be calculated based on the
expected duration of the employment and ihe excess income above the average veterinarian. In
addition, Dr. Brenda has career goodwill associated with her veterinary degree and license. The
career goodwill value of the degree and license may be calculated in the same manner as the
value of Dr. Able's license and degree was calculated above.
only about two years. Pratt et al. Quote studies that show a total discount for lack of
marketability of 30% to 60%
the annual discount rate for restricted shares in private
placements. See Pratt et al.,anote 61, at 332. Total discount and annual discount rates are
not directly comparable. A 50% total discount rate for lack of marketability increases a 20%
annual discount rate to 46.6% for a constant cash flow with 10-year life span. See spreadsheet
calculations performed by author (on file with author).
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spreadsheet calculations performed by author (on file with author).

The third hypothetical example illustrates that nonprofessional employees may also
acquire career goodwill by developing repeat customers, sales contacts, and similar intangible
career assets. Chuck may acquire excess earnings through commissions, bonuses, and a
premium salary based on the sales contacts developed during his marriage. Chuck's excess
earnings may be calculated by the difference in income that he receives compared to the typical
entry-level sales employee. This excess earnings stream has a life span that can be estimated
based on the duration of the average customer's continued patronage. For example, if the
average stockbroker's customers continue to rely on her for investment services for an average of
seven years, then seven years might be an appropriate estimate of the career goodwill life span.
These three examples indicate that career goodwill can be valued as the present value of a
stream of future income. Admittedly, a number of simplifications were introduced in the
calculations to avoid confusing the issue. For example, the excess income of all three individuals

' )

would be expected to increase or decrease over time. Taxes were also neglected in these
examples; unless the jurisdiction refuses to consider tax consequences of a property award
because of the speculative nature of the future tax rate, income taxes should be considered before
excess earnings are determined. Despite these simplifications, this method of valuing career
goodwill allows investments in human capital to be recognized consistently and independently of
the form that the investment may take.

IX. Conclusion
The post-industrial informational economy requires our entire society to rethink
traditional conceptions of wealth as tangible goods have less permanent value. Income
generating capacity is the new standard of wealth in this age. Accountants and economists
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recognize that income-generating capacity is a form of property, goodwill. Goodwill is a present
property interest, as evidenced by the willingness of buyers to pay premium prices for businesses
with above-average income generating capacity.
Courts must recognize that human capital is a form of goodwill that can be valued by
reference to its income generating capacity. Goodwill is a present, intangible property interest
rather than a mere expectancy. This article has presented a method for valuing human capital, in
whatever form, as career goodwill. Courts may apply this method to value professional
practices, advanced education and specialized training, professional licenses, customer lists, and
any other intangible asset that provides an individual with superior income generating ability.
Community investments in the human capital of one of the spouses must be valued as career
goodwill and recognized as divisible community property if the policies underlying community
property law are to be preserved for this type of property.

